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Judging and Democracy*
BY HoN. DIARMUiD F. O'SCANNLAIN*"
have been thinking about the role of judging in our system of
democracy, one of the most successful free governments in world
history. Famous quotations in praise of democracy abound. In his
Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln spoke ofpreserving government "of
the people, by the people, [and] for the people."' Mark Twain proclaimed
that "where every man in a State has a vote, brutal laws are impossible."2
Perhaps most effusive in its praise of democracy is the 1604 declaration of
Parliament to James I, which states: "The voice of the people, in the things
of their knowledge, is as the voice of God."3
I do not undertake a normative defense of democracy. The historical
evidence suggests to me that democracies are generally more prosperous
* Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Lecture delivered to the Federalist Society
at the University of Kentucky College of Law (Nov. 15,2000) (transcript available
in the University of Kentucky College of Law Library).
7 Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
'ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Gettysburg Address, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 7:17,23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
2 MARK TWAIN, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, 1889, in THE
WORKS OF MARK TWAIN 9:288 (Bernard L. Stein ed., 1979).
3 The End ofDemocracy? The Judicial Usurpation ofPolitics, FIRST THINGS,
Nov. 1996, at 18.
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than non-democracies. Nonetheless, I will not attempt to convince those of
you who are believers in oligarchy, monarchy, anarchy, or any other form
of government that you are wrong. Rather, the question I intend to answer
is, assuming the existence of a democratic system of government, which, I
believe, is essentially the system we have, what is the proper role of the
judiciary within that system?
In exploring this subject, we should begin with the question: Why does
a democracy need judges? If democracy is government by the populace,
then why not have the populace decide the cases? The short answer is that
it is simply not feasible to require all electors to vote on every dispute that
arises between citizens. Even a republican form of government does not
solve this problem. Sitting as a 535-member court, the United States
Congress could not decide even a small percentage of the 250,000 cases
currently filed in federal court each year.
Because it is impossible for the citizens of a democracy to sit in
judgment of every dispute arising within its borders, those citizens delegate
to certain individuals, called legislators, the responsibility to establish
general rules, or statutes, to govern those disputes, and further delegate to
other individuals, called judges, the responsibility to apply those rules to
particular controversies. The core function of ajudge in a democracy, then,
is to apply general rules to concrete controversies involving specific
litigants. By specializing in interpreting the rules of the democracy and
giving them content in the context of specific disputes, the citizen-judge
frees up other members of the democracy to spend more time specializing
in other avocations. As a result of this specialization, the democratic body
as a whole is made better off.
However, when judges act as anything other than interpreters, they
profoundly affect the democratic process. In United States v. Weber,' a
decision I want to discuss at some length, the 1979 Supreme Court did
something very instructive. Weber involved a white steelworker's chal-
lenge, brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to an affirmative action
plan designed to eliminate racial imbalances in a workforce in which only
two percent of the skilled craftworkers were black.5 The plan reserved for
black employees fifty percent of the openings in a craft training program
until the percentage of craftworkers in the plan was commensurate with the
percentage of blacks in the local labor force. During the first year of the
affirmative action plan, seven blacks and six whites were selected for the
program, despite the fact that the most senior black selected had less
4 United States v.Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
5 Id. at 199.
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seniority than several whites who were rejected. Brian Weber, a white
worker who was not selected, instituted a class action complaint, charging
that the training program favored black employees over white employees,
thereby violating section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
"discriminat[ion] against any individual... because of... race."6
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court, rejecting
what it referred to dismissively as a "literal construction of section 703(a),"
held that private affirmative action plans are not prohibited by Title VII.7
Relying on snippets of legislative history discussing "the plight of the
Negro in our economy,"8 the Court concluded that although the Congress
of 1964 might have said that it was prohibiting "discrimination... on the
basis of race," what it actually meant was that it was prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of race except where the person discriminated against was
white.9
Writing in dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist attacked what he called the
majority's Orwellian reasoning.'0 Justice Rehnquist stated:
The operative sections of Title VII prohibit racial discrimination in
employment simpliciter. Taken in its normal meaning... this language
prohibits a covered employer from considering race when making an
employment decision, whether the race be black or white.
Now we are told that the legislative history of Title VII shows that
employers are free to discriminate on the basis of race .... Our earlier
interpretations of Title VII... were all wrong."
In a separate dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger observed that,
were he a member of Congress, he would have voted to amend Title VII to
permit affirmative action. However, Chief Justice Burger concluded that he
was unable as ajudge to join the result reached by the majority in Weber for
the simple reason that it was contrary to the plain language of Title VIL 2
On balance, I find myself in agreement with Chief Justice Burger's
reasoning. It may very well be in a society's best interest to allow private
6 Id. at 199-200 n.2.
7 Id. at 200-02.
8 Id. at 202 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey)).
9 Id at 201-08.
'ld. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id at 220-21.
1Id. at 216 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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employers to adopt voluntary affirmative action programs; however, that
is a question for voters, and legislators, not judges, to decide.
Many commentators have criticized the majority's reasoning in Weber
as result-oriented. Instead of interpreting the law, they maintain, the Court
was making law.13 But the majority in Weber itself said that it was en-
gaging in interpretation. Although the Webermajority virtually ignored the
text of the Civil Rights Act, it did focus on the legislative history of the
Act. In other words, although the Court overlooked what Congress actually
said when it passed the statute, it did set forth at least a plausible version
of what Congress may have intended." After examining the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act, the Weber majority concluded that although
the letter of the law prohibited reverse discrimination, the spirit of the law
allowed it. The Weber majority explained: "It is a 'familiar rule, that a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' "1 In
defending the interpretative method used in Weber, Professor Ronald
Dworkin has stated:
The law, as Scalia emphasizes, is what Congress has said .... Not
everyone agrees with that judgment. Some lawyers think that it accords
better with democracy if judges defer to reasonable assumptions about
what most legislators wanted or would have wanted, even when the
language they used does not embody those actual or hypothetical
wishes.1
6
With respect, I conclude that the method of interpretation used in
Weber and defended by Professor Dworkin is in tension with the concept
of democratic government. As I explained earlier, judges are citizens upon
whom we delegate the responsibility of interpreting our laws and applying
them to concrete disputes. But if interpretation means whatever judges
want it to mean, then the purpose behind this delegation of responsibility
is defeated. As Justice Scalia has explained:
3 See Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: FairShakers andSocialEngineers,
99 HARV. L. REv. 1312 (1986); Donna A. Adler, A ConversationalApproach to
Statutory Analysis: Say What You Mean & Mean What You Say, 66 Miss. Li. 37,
57 (1996); Frederick Schauer, The Constitution as Text andRule, 29 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 41 (1987).
14 Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.
51d. (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,459 (1892)).
16 Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 115, 118
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even
with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what
the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated. That
seems to be one step worse than the trick the emperor Nero was said to
engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not
easily be read. Government by unexpressed intent is similarly tyrannical.
It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. That seems to me
the essence of the famous American ideal set forth in the Massachusetts
constitution: A government of laws, not of men. Men may intend what
they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.17
A second problem with interpreting laws based on what Congress may
have meant notwithstanding what it actually said is that such a method risks
the likelihood that the judges' own values and prejudices might infect their
decision making. When judges want to ignore the text of a statute to achieve
what they believe is a socially desirable result, it is relatively easy to use the
legislative history of that statute as an excuse to accomplish that end. Inmy
career as an appellate court judge, it has been the rare case in which either
party could not cite pages of legislative history to support its interpretation
of the law at issue. When judges are bound by the text of the law, there is
less opportunity to engage in result-oriented adjudication. When I interpret
the text of a statute, I attempt to determine the ordinary meaning of the
words used in the statute at the time the law was passed. This involves using
the definition of the word given in a dictionary published as nearly as
possible to the time the law was enacted. Although I do not contend that this
method of interpretation removes all discretion from the judging process,
it involves considerably less discretion than when a judge simply picks
whichever version of the legislative history he believes supports his view
of what the law should say. In my view, such a reduction in discretion is an
unmitigated good, as it makes it more likely that judges will interpret the
law in accordance with how a majority of citizens wants them to interpret
the law.
The method of interpretation I have just advocated-interpreting the
law according to what the legislature said as opposed to what the legislature
may have meant-is known, of course, as textualism. As I have already
discussed, textualism has several advantages, not the least of which is that
it reduces judges' discretion to allow their own policy preferences to seep
into the judging process. One of the arguments frequently used to criticize
' Justice Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution andLaws, in
A MATrE OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 16, at 3, 17.
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textualism goes something like this: Textualism is a nice theory, but,
unfortunately for textualists, it has no basis in the text of the United States
'Constitution or in any federal statute. However, that argument, as I see it,
is flawed. Section I of Article I of the United States Constitution provides:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representa-
tives." 8 When a court departs from the text of the statute, and thereby
effectively rewrites or amends the statute, it seems to me that it
impermissibly infringes upon the legislative power of Congress. This is
exactly what the Supreme Court did in Weber with respect to Title VII,
amending the provision barring discrimination against certain races. In so
doing, the Court was acting contrary to Article I, Section I, of the Constitu-
tion, which places all legislative power in the hands of Congress. New laws,
or amendments to old ones, must be approved by a majority of both Houses
of Congress, not merely by a handful of members of the federal judiciary.
By now, many of you are probably thinking: Well, isn't it the role of
the judiciary to protect against the excesses of the majority? Don't courts
have the duty under Marbury v. Madison19 to strike down statutes that
conflict with the United States Constitution, even if those statutes are
supported by a majority of the population?
Of course, the answer to both of these questions is "yes." Does this
mean that there is a tension between democracy and the judiciary's role in
our constitutional system? According to many constitutional scholars, it
does. One of the foremost expositors of this view was Alexander Bickel. In
The Least Dangerous Branch, Professor Bickel stated:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force
in our system .... [W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional
a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises
control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That,
without mystic overtones, is what actually happens.... [I]t is the reason
the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic.
20
In my view, however, it is not difficult to reconcile the institution of
judicial review with democracy. The Constitution is, as Article VI tells us,
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
9 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH-THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (emphasis added).
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the "supreme Law of the Land."' The Constitution is law not because it
was divinely inspired, or because its language was drafted by people with
high I.Q's, but because it was duly ratified by the people of the United
States at thirteen state conventions held between 1787 and 1790.? Since
Marbury v. Madison, it has been recognized that rules which the people
approved when they ratified the Constitution trump rules which are enacted
into ordinary federal statutes. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Marbury:
"'That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their
own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been
erected." Marshall continued: "Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government
must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the Constitution is
void."
One of the key distinctions between provisions of the Constitution and
provisions of federal statutes concerns the relative ease with which each
type of provision can be altered. Article V of the Constitution requires that
constitutional amendments be proposed by either a Convention called by
two-thirds of the state legislatures or by three-fourths of both Houses and
ratified by three-fourths ofthe state legislatures. By contrast, federal statutes
can be repealed by a bare majority of the members of the House and the
Senate with presidential consent. Therefore, as a general matter,
constitution-making requires a substantially higher level of popular support
than statute-making does.
Professor Bickel lamented that "when the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it
thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and
now ... ,,4 Under Bickel's analysis, if three-fourths of the House propose
and three-fourths of the state legislatures ratify a constitutional amendment,
and the Supreme Court relies on that amendment to strike down an
inconsistent statute supported by bare majorities of both Houses of
Congress and signed by the President, the Supreme Court's action thwarts
the will of the people.
2 1 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
22 See Ralph Ketcham, Introduction to THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONsnTuTIONALCONVENTIONDEBATES 3,14 (Ralph Ketcham ed., Mentor Books
1986).
23 Id at 177.
24BIcKEL, supra note 20, at 16-17.
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But there is nothing anti-democratic about this. To see why, let us make
the assumption that constitutional amendments require the approval oftwo-
thirds, and that federal statutes require the support of fifty-one percent.
Bickel apparently thought it problematic that sixty-seven percent can bind
future bare majorities which cannot muster the support necessary to pass
constitutional amendments. However, binding people who disagree with
laws to adhere to those laws is the essence of a civilized government.
Bickel's analysis fails to recognize that, any time an ordinary statute is
passed, that statute can only be overturned if over half'ofthe people support
its repeal. To use Bickel's language, the passage of a new statute may
thwart the will of up to forty-nine percent of the representatives of the
people of the here and now. The only difference between such a statute and
a constitutional amendment is that, whereas the statute may thwart the will
of up to half of the people, the amendment may thwart the will of nearly
two-thirds of the people. This difference is not one of kind but of degree.
Essentially, democracy is rule by the people. If the people can make the
rules, the people can also make rules regarding how the rules can be
changed. I am unaware of any legal principle that democracy cannot require
the support of more than a bare majority of citizens to alter its fundamental
law. This is exactly what Americans did do when they ratified Article V of
the Constitution. Far from being anti-democractic, the principle that a
statute is void when it is repugnant to a provision of the constitution is
fundamental to our constitutional democracy.
Many constitutional commentators have stressed the need for an activist
federal judiciary to check the excesses of the majority. In the absence of
such a check against the majority, they maintain, there is no principled way
to prevent the rise of a totalitarian regime.
This argument, which is advanced frequently in constitutional
discourse,' is a powerful one. It would be terrible indeed for our country
ever to fall subject to a totalitarian regime. The question is, whom do we
trust to prevent the rise of such a regime? Should we place our trust in an
unelected judiciary, or should we place our trust in the people themselves?
This is in part an empirical question, and we must look to history to help
answer it. The American judiciary has not always stood up against
government tyranny; indeed, it has sometimes facilitated it. For example,
in the infamous Dred Scott case,26 the Supreme Court "discovered" in the
2 See Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in
Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 433 (1996) (referring to
argument as "reductio ad Hitlerum").26Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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Due Process Clause of the Constitution the right to own slaves. Many
commentators point to Brown v. Board ofEducation27 as evidence that the
Supreme Court can help to correct for the occasional failings of the
democratic process. However, as Justice Scalia has observed with respect
to Brown, even a stopped clock is right twice a day. The Supreme Court is
a human institution, after all.
I do not have blind faith in the ability of the people to prevent the rise
of a totalitarian regime. Neither do I have blind faith in the power of the
judiciary to do so. I do, however, have faith in the Constitution of the
United States. In my view, the brilliance of the Constitution lies in its
structural provisions. By dividing power between the federal and state
governments and then between the various branches within each, the
Constitution, to use the words of James Madison in Federalist No. 51,
provides a "double security... to the rights of the people."28 As Madison
explained:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest ofman must
be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a
reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to
control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the
greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary.
29
In my view, the primary reason that our Constitution has served us so
well for so long is that it has been successful in dividing the powers of
government Regrettably, however, the federal judiciary occasionally steps
outside of its constitutionally defined role. The federal judiciary best fulfills
its role within the Madisonian framework not when it tries to do it all, but
when it acts within its constitutionallyprescribed role. This involves leaving
the task of legislating to Congress, and leaving the task of constitution-
making to the procedures established by Article V.
So far, I have confined my remarks to the role of federal judges, and the
relationship between the federal judiciary and the other branches of the
federal government. However, also vitally important to the well-being of
our constitutional democracy, is the relationship between the federal and
state judiciaries. As the Supreme Court has reminded us:
27Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).




Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front.... In the tension between federal and state power lies
the promise of liberty.30
The framers did not intend that the federal and state governments were
to have equal power. Rather, under the Constitution, most government
functions were to remain in the hands of the states. As Madison explained
in Federalist No. 45: "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain
in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."3'
As we are all aware, the powers exercised by the federal government
are no longer "few" or "defined." The federal government now exercises
pervasive regulatory authority over activities that were once exclusively
policed by the states. Indeed, there appeared for a time to be a danger that
an activist judiciary would transform the narrow constitutional authority
that allows the federal government to exercise a few clearly defined powers
into a general police power comparable to that retained by the states.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court at least temporarily halted this trend in
United States v. Lopez32 where the Court struck down a federal law
prohibiting gun possession within 1000 feet of schools, holding that
Congress may regulate only those activities which truly have a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce.3
As Justice Kennedy pointed out in his concurring opinion in Lopez, the
chief source of adjudication regarding federalism has been the Commerce
Clause.3 In deciding Commerce Clause questions, courts have traditionally
focused on the relationship between Congress and the state legislatures.
Less attention, however, has been concentrated on the relatiopship between
the federal and state judiciaries.
In examining the proper relationship between the federal and state
judiciaries, we return to Marbury v. Madison,35 which perhaps more than
3o Gregory v. Ashcrot, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
31 THm FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
32 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
33 Id at 559.
1 Id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
35Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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any other American case has shaped our understanding of the duties of
judges. In what is perhaps his most famous line in Marbury, Chief Justice
Marshall stated: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.
36
Marshall's opinion in Marbury has often been misinterpreted, but
perhaps the most serious interpretive error, one which even some of the
most respected constitutional scholars have committed, concerns the nature
of the relationship between federal and state judges. According to Harvard
Professor Laurence Tribe's treatise on American Constitutional Law,37
Marbury was "the first case in which the Supreme Court asserted that a
federal court has power to refuse to give effect to congressional legislation
... ,,38 However, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion was not restricted to the
duties of federal courts; rather, the opinion applies to all courts.39 Through-
out his opinion, Marshall refers to "courts" and "judges," never to "federal
courts" or "federaljudges."' In other words, Marbury teaches that the task
of interpreting federal statutory and constitutional law is as much the
province of the state judiciary as it is the province of the federal judiciary.
As the first Justice Harlan stated in Robb v. Connolly:4 "Upon the State
courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard,
enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of
the United States .... 142
Justice Harlan's statement teaches us that when it comes to the task of
interpreting federal law, neither the federal nor the state judiciary stands
supreme. Interpreting the Constitution is not a hierarchical task but a
cooperative process involving continuous dialogue among judges at all
levels of both the state and the federal systems.43
State courts have always played a vital role in the protection of federal
rights. From the time of the Founding, state courts have exercised exclusive
or concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions.44 By
36 Id. at 177.
37 LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
39 Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
39 See Paul Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22
WM. & MARY L. Rv. 605, 628-29 (1981).
4 Id.
41 Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884).
42Ia at 637.
43 Bator, supra note 39, at 634-35.
44RICHARD H. FALLoN ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTs AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 29 (4th ed. 1996).
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contrast, it was not until 1875 that Congress granted general federal
question jurisdiction to the federal courts. 41
In our constitutional system, it is not the federal courts but the state
courts that stand as the last line of defense against overreaching by the
executive and legislative branches. Article III of the Constitution makes no
mention of federal district courts or federal courts of appeals, the so-called
"inferior courts." Consequently, the ability of the federal courts to enforce
federal constitutional and statutory rights is entirely subject to Congress's
willingness to grant them jurisdiction to do so. If Congress wanted to, it
could exclude from the jurisdiction of the federal courts any category of
claims arising under the Constitution, or even eliminate the lower federal
courts altogether. 6 By contrast, Congress cannot limit the jurisdiction of the
state courts so as to foreclose the vindication of federal constitutional rights.
Thus, it is not the federal courts but the state courts that serve as the
ultimate check againstusurpation ofconstitutional liberties by the executive
and legislative branches.
In closing, let me reiterate that our constitutional democracy has served
us extremely well for over 200 years. In my view, the greatest threat to that
system today stems from the federaljudiciary's inflated view of its own role
within our constitutional structure. Federal judges must allow state judges
to assume their rightful place as the coequal protectors of federal constitu-
tional rights. Federal judges must also resist the temptation to legislate our
own policy preferences, instead contenting ourselves with interpreting the
law. Only then will the federal judiciary fulfill its proper constitutional role
in our integrated democratic system.
" Act of Mar. 3, 1875 ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994)); see also ERwIN CHEMERMNSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1994).
4U.S. CONST. art. IHI.
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